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1. The general concept
It is not uncommon for companies to discuss what legal form to
choose within a nation, and during recent years it was not
uncommon ¡n Europe to take regulatory authorities to courts in order
to allow choosing a legal form from another European country to be
used in the country where business is performed. This indicates that
national systems of corporate governance impact on the competitive
position of companies. In this paper, specific interrelationships of
corporate governance with technological change are considered.
The general concept is sketched in Figure 1. It is well known that
technological change can influence business success of companies,
particularly if this technological change is unique for a particular
company and for some period of time at least. Many summarizing
studies on this relationship are available (Brockhoff, K., 1998;
Brockhoff, K., 1999). Early work on corporate governance did not
empirically look into potential impacts on business success (Bleicher,
K.; Wagner, D., 1993). However, as a general hypothesis corporate
governance scholars assume that by choosing systems that minimize
transaction cost and agency cost for a particular firm within a
national environment of regulations, it is possible to set the stage for
business success (Witt, P, 2003a, 2, p. 11). The choice of the most
efficient governance systems promises a head-start in systems
competition. Empirical research on success models of corporate
governance is mostly concentrated on financial performance data,
and it takes control efficiency of managements by financial markets,
by legal systems or by board structures into account (Daily, C.M.;
Alton, D.R., 1992; Lehmann, E.; Weigand, 3., 2000; Witt, P., 2003a;
Gompers, PJ.; Ishii; 3.; Metrick, A., 2003; Czarnitzki, D.; Kraft; K,
2004c; Drobetz, W.; Schillhofer, A.; Zimmermann, H. 2004). Also,
supporting perceptional data that compare governance systems at
an intemational level are available (Gedajlovic, E.R.; Shapiro, D.,
1998; Demirag, I.PP.; Tylecote, A., 1998).
Taking these relationships for granted it is then important to explore
whether technological change and corporate governance influence
each other. As seen ¡n Figure 1 there could be two types of
influences. The "technological imperative", as it was called by
Orlikowski (1992), would comprise any influences of technological
change on governance structures or processes. The "strategic
1
choice" (Orlikowski, WJ., 1992) summarizes all influences that
corporate governance can have on technological change. In this
paper we want to explore these two types of relationships: Do they
exist? Can influencing variables by ¡dentified?
Technological
Change
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imperative
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Strategic
choice
Corporate
Governance
i
Business
success
Figure 1: The concept of the relationships
Should such relationships be identified, it has a twofold importance.
First, it is important for management to choose corporate
governance structures that maximize corporate objectives, induding
technological change. Second, regulatory agencies should consider
their responsibility to offer corporate governance models that help
firms to optimize their objectives.
In goes without saying that the model presented above is overly
simplistic. Other interacting variables on business success are not
shown. Feedback loops from success to the variables shown (dotted
lines in Figure 1) are not explicitJy covered (Cho, M.H., 1998). No
explidt mention is made of dynamics, which arise from feedbacks or
have other reasons. As will become clear later, empirical research
that considere these ¡ssues ¡s extremely scarce.
2. The variables
Figure 1 refere to three highly complex and interacting variables.
None of the variables finds a generally accepted definition. Even if
such definitions were available, one could not be sure whether their
operationalization would be ¡dentical. No strict standards can be
enforced to arrive at better comparisons of empirical research and ¡ts
results. Economic success, for instance, could refer to achieved or to
expected future success. Success itself could be measured for
instance by stock market performance or by financial results. In this
case, many special ways of calculation are available. Companies
applying economic valué added report on more than 150 adaptations
of annual report data, many of which are company specific or
industry specific, to arrive at the final result.
Corporate Governance is a construct variable as well. It is described
as "a more-or-less country-specific framework of legal, institutional
and cultural factors shaping the patterns of influence that
stakeholders exert on managerial decisión making" (Weimer, J.;
Pape, J., 1999). These decisions influence "direction and
performance of corporations" (Monks, R.A.G.; Minow, N., 2001, p.
1). Conflict resolution and power distribution are major tasks of
corporate governance systems (Witt, P., 2003a, p. 1; Munari, F.;
Sobrero, M, 2003, p. 3). A bit too narrow is the view that
concentrates on minimizing the cost of supervising and controlling
management by owners of a company (Richter, R.; Furubotn, E.G.,
2003, p. 67). In Germany, the concept of "Unternehmensverfassung"
or "company constitution" was used long before the corporate
governance carne into general use (Chmielewicz, K., 1991, p. 84;
Hauschildt, J., 1999, p. 60).
Even if the broader definition is accepted it needs to be made
operational. The "patterns of influence", however, can be manifold,
they can be substitutive or complementary, and if influence is
exerted by a group of people these can hold conflicting views on the
course to travel (Hauschildt, 1,1999; Hópner, M., 2001).
One example of a possible operationalization of the concept is given
by Weimer and Pape (1999). They suggest considering eight
variables:
a. The prevailing concept of the firm.
b. The board system.
c. The salient stakeholders aWe to exert influence on
managerial decision-making.
d. The importance of stock markets ¡n the national economy.
e. The presence or absence of an external market for corporate
control.
f. The ownership structure.
g. The extent to which executive compensation ¡s dependent
on corporate performance.
h. The time horizon of economic relationships.
Based on these variables, Weimer/Pape (1999) conclude that four
groups of govemance systems can be ¡dentified: The Anglo-Saxon
Countries, the Germanic Countries, the Latín Countries and Japan. If
such groups could in fact be clearly identified ¡t would be very
helpful to broaden the basis for comparative empirical research.
Unfortunately, grouping countries is not quite as easy. An ¡ndication
of this the authors' grouping of Switzerland, with a one-tier system
of corporate boards, together with Germany and Austria with their
two-tier systems. Furthermore, a more controlled procedure for
clustering would have been advisable. Cluster analysis methodology
is an interesting approach for this (Schmidt, R., 2003).
It should also be noted that the individual elements of a corporate
governance system can be measured in different ways. Also, the
elements may at least partially overiap with variables used in other
subsystems of a corporate environment. This is shown in Figure 2.
Even this view is not exhaustive, as can be concluded from the
suggestion to look at tax systems and their impact on managerial
behavior (Betz, 2004).
Furthermore, a description of corporate governance by using certain
institutional elements covers procedural ¡ssues, such as
transparency, only ¡mplicitly.
National
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Other
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Figure 2: Overlapping environmental subsystems with potential
influence on technological change and innovation at the company
level
Consequently, comparing research results on corporate governance
has to be taken with a grain of salt. No standardized construct is
available.
The same has to be concluded with respect to the other construct,
technological change. At first, this construct might be split into two
major variables, namely technology and innovation. An indicator for
technology could be research and development expenditures. It
generates potentials for innovations as explanation for competitive
strength just as seen in the resource-based view. A crude indicator
for innovation could be a zero-one-variable that measures whether a
company is able to introduce one or more new products or new
processes during a specific period of time (Czarnitzki, D.; Kraft, K.;
2004b). While it is plausible to assume that corporate governance is
influenced by innovations, governance itself might impact on
technology or on innovation in different ways. To make the points
more clear, we demónstrate the interplay of the terms technology
and innovation in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Relationships between technology and innovation
3. The technological imperative relationship
With these reservations on methodology in mind we now turn to the
first of the interesting relationships, namely the imperative
relationship. We intend to collect evidence for its existence.
3.1. Examples
In limiting our scope we only ask whether examples can be found
where product innovations have an influence on corporate
governance. These producís can be information technology or
communication technology innovations in the first place.
1. Innovative IT-products, such as conference calis or video
conferencing, could be used to increase the frequency of
information exchange among managers, to speed up
decisión making, to tighten control and to reduce travel cost.
In view of this, the Germán Governmental Commission on
Corporate Governance suggested a change of law that in the
past asked for personal presence for instance in board
meetings (Regierungskommission Corporate Governance,
2001, Rz. 247). Other countries permit making routine-type
decisions at board level in virtual meetings (Noack, U.;
Beurskens, M., 2002, p. 154). The plausible expectations
raised here are not fully met in reality. In fact, a
"telecommunication paradox" has been observed (Picot, A.;
Reichwald, R.; Wigand, R.T., 1996, p. 94; Pribilla, P.;
Reichwald, R.; Goecke, R.T., 1996, p. 236). It describes that
most intensive users of IT are not able to subst'tute their
use for personal presence. Any productivity gains from the
use of electronic media is used for increased personal
contacts. This ¡s considered as the prerequisite for effective
use of electronic media that due to their reduced capacity
relies heavily on trustful relationships. Also, productivity
gains might be eaten up by an expansión of management
tasks, be that with respect to geography, product ranges,
customer relations or hierarchy levéis. The example shows
that management processes are influenced by an innovation.
2. Shareholders can make use of information technologies to
lower the cost of participation in annual general meetings, to
particípate in such meetings by on-line voting, to organize
shareholder-groups of like interests to influence decisions, to
make use of the instantaneous and equal availability of
corporate information for heir investment decisions
(Regierungskommission Corporate Governance, 2001, Rz.
248, 249; Goedecke, C; Heuser, F., 2001; Claussen, C.P.,
2001; Pikó, R.; Preissler, T., 2002; Noack, U.; Beurskens, M.,
2002). As before, these opportunities might come at a price.
In Germany, some shareholders have effectively prohibited
the on-line presence of a shareholders meeting beyond the
opening and the address by the chairman of the
management board. These shareholders argüe that showing
their presence in the meeting interferes with their
personality rights (Noack, U., 2001, p. 17). Thus, 'Virtual"
participants are unable to have immediate knowledge of the
evolvement of the agenda following the speech of the
chairperson.
Lower cost of participation could also lead to a "race to the
bottom" with respect to the quality and scope of
contributions to the debate during the meeting (Spindler, G.;
Hüther, M., 2000). Even the term "anarchic democracy" has
been used to describe possible developments that go far
beyond behaviors observed in present annual general
meetings (Euler, E., 2003). Both of these developments cali
for an extended catalogue of means to manage the meetings
and to curb potential misuse. The ease of asking
shareholders for their decisions might lead to a shift of
power from the management to the shareholders. This
would certalnly change historically grown corporate
governance structures and processes.
3. Corporations can use electronic media to establish closer
contacts with their shareholders (Goedecke, C ; Heuser, F.,
2001; Oaussen, C.P., 2001, p. 165; Heller, A. et al,. 2002).
Financial marketing and investor relations can thus be based
on more up-to-date information or information not controlled
by intermedíate media. However, boards might be reluctant
to accept thís, since ¡t increases the control possibilities of
shareholders via the financial markets (Euler, E., 2003).
4. Increasing speed of technological change externally
generated increases the demand for fast and flexible
decisión making at the board level. This could include to
cióse down particular áreas of technological knowledge
generation within the firm, and to open up other. It is made
plausible that the Germán governance structure together
with labor-law rigidities is less able to cope with fast
technology changes as compared with British governance
structures and labor laws (Casper, PP.; Matraves, C, 2003).
When Tobin's Q is accepted as an indicator of technology
driven growth potentials, then it is relevant to observe that
US companies with higher growth potentials chose a more
long-term incentive structure for management, more
management shareholdings and more insiders on the board
(McGuire, J., 1992). While a number of methodological
issues remain unresolved, such as whether median or
marginal Q's are more appropriate, and causality is there
only by assumption, the case generalized the observation of
an influence of environmental complexity on governance
structures (Zajac, E.J.; Westphal, J. D., 1994).
3.2. Resulte
Considering the four groups of examples ¡t ¡s fair to condude that a
technological imperatve exists. Extant studies, however, have not
yet dealt with issues such as the changes ¡n power structures and
conflict regulation as a consequence of technological change. Could
¡t be that present governance structures, which were principally
defined many decennia ago, are better able to deal with less rapid
technological change than with more rapid change? Could simulation
models of process structuring be of help in answering questions
relating to speed and quality of decisión making? A number of
unresolved questions remain beyond the more general observation.
4. The strategic choice relationship
Let us now tum to the second relationship of interest. I t deals with
potential influences of corporate governance on technological
change. This issue ¡s by far more complex than the first one.
4.1 . National comparisons
Governance systems were defined as different between nations or,
less stringently, between groups of nations. Therefore, a first
attempt at exploring the strategic choice relationship is to rnake
country comparisons. Certainly, a strong caveat arises from the fact
that nations do not differ with respect to governance systems alone.
1. A very telling observation is that socialist economies have
not proven to be as capable of initiating technological
change as market economies. It was Chmielewicz (1991)
who remarked very early after the Germán re-unification
that the accompanying change of governance structures
influences at the same time the conditions and problems of
innovations. A more detailed analysis, however, is missing.
2. Therefore, it might be usefui to turn to market economies
with different corporate governance structures. Here, it is
argued that some systems favor radical innovations, while
others favor incremental innovations. "Thus, British firms
have a comparative advantage in radical ¡nnovation ¡n new
sectors and price competition in stagnating or declining
sectors while Germán companies have a comparative
advantage in so-called medium-tech sectors characterized by
¡ncremental innovation and large firm-specific human capital
¡nvestments" (Vitols, P.P., 2001, p. 359). A similar conclusión
was drawn by Casper/Matraves (2003).
Since the authors just mentioned draw on the same set of
empirical data it is of interest to look for further ¡ndependent
sources. In an interview-based case study of Astra-Zeneca it
is shown that the hybrid mixture of governance systems
resulting from the two originally independent companies that
were merged exhibits inside orientations of the Swedish
origin that favor more incremental innovations as well as
outside orientations of British origin that favors more radical
innovations (Ramírez, P.; Tylecote, A., 2004). A second case
deals with Lufthansa AG. For the 1980's it is argued that the
relatively weak position of the chairman of the management
board as well as co-determination hampered the strategic
innovation potenrJal of the firm: "...the Germán corporate
governance system placed powerful restrictions on the CEO's
ability to alter the power structure and technical orientation
within Lufthansa" (Lehrer, M., 1997, p. 131). Corporate
governance ¡n Italy is thought to favor industries with "low
novelty, low visibility, and low appropriability" (where
appropriability refers to the shareholders ability to secure
profits against competitors) (Schmidt, R., 2004, p. 317
referring to Visintin, 2001).
This line of argumentaban has even led to the point where
national differences in governance systems have been taken
as an explanation for intemational trade with differently
innovative producís (Hall, P.A.; Soskice, D., 2001).
The national financial system has some overlap with the
governance system. As a result of a 13 country study of
financial systems ¡t is concluded that outsider-dominated
countries, like the US or Great Britain, corporations have a
more short-term orientations as compared with insider-
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dominated countries, fike Japan or Germany (Demirag, P.P.;
Tylecote, A., 1998). Outside orientation, in consequence,
leads to favoring development over research. Furthermore,
this should result in more ¡ncremental rather than radical
¡nnovations. Certainly, this result is in conflict with the one in
the preceding paragraph.
In Germany, prívate equity financing received attention only
relatively lately. Some authors consider this to be
detrimental for fostering radical innovations (Kaiser, R.;
Prange, H., 2004; indirectly also: Audretsch, D.B.; Lehmann,
E.E., 2004).
Taking the tast two paragraphs together it is obvious that
none of the studies presents a summarizing evaluation of
governance ano'financia! system aspects on technology and
innovation.
4. This lack of a summarizing view becomes even more obvious
when governmental policy is induded. A study on French
industry indicates that in earlier years, when insider oriented
governance was dominant, the French government tried to
compénsate an apparent lack of radical innovations by
lending substantial development support to industry. In later
years with more outside-oriented aspects, French industry
used an acquisition strategy to support its innovative
potential (Goyer, M., 2001). Unfortunately, the author fails
to make the dependent variable explicit to the degree that
one could follow his argumentation easily and eventually
rvrn measure relative impact of different constructs.
4.2. Individual variables
4.2.1. Composition of management boards
In countries with one-tíer board systems it is asked to what
degree the share of ¡nsiders vs. outsiders effects innovative
potential. Empirical research shows that "insider-dominated
boards may be more effective in fostering innovation"
(Munari, F.,; Sobrero, M., 2003, p. 21). A possible
11
explanaron could be that insiders have better information on
innovation opportunities and their risks. This is supported if
outsiders have similar information and support the
management. The information networks of outsiders appear
to be of different kind, and their task of supervising
management might reduce innovative potential. Note that
the character of innovations is not addressed here. Thus, a
larger number of incremental innovations might more than
compénsate a small number of radical innovations.
2. In Germany, co-determination on the supervisory board of
the prevailing two-tier system is an issue with respect to its
effect on innovation. Distributive effects of co-determination
lead to a reduced return, which has been called negotiated
shareholder valué (Vitols, PP., 2001, p. 350). From very
early on ¡n the debate on Germán co-determination it was
argued that more respect for social demands could lead to
such negotiated shareholder valué and thus reduce the
incentives for innovation (Sachverstándigenkommission,
1970, p. 42; Prosi, G., 1978, p. 48). On the other hand it
was hoped that labor unión representatives would use their
power wisely (Albach, H., 1994, p. 345), and workers would
make more contributions for improving processes and
products because they enjoy more job security (Dilger, A.,
1999, p. 210). Unfortunately, as was true more than ten
years ago, we have only very scarce research on the effects
of co-determination at the board level and within the
companies on innovation potential (Hamel, W., 1993). In a
summary of earlier research ¡t is ¡ndicated that co-
determination seems to lead to higher research and
development expenditures but to lower product innovation
rates (Hübler, O., 2003). The same study also makes clear
that results depend on the way that co-determination is
measured. If the quality of contributions by worker
representatives in a firm is not only considered as a zero-one
variable but measured on a five-step scale (antagonista,
difficult, non-interested, not considered, cooperative), ¡t is
argued that cooperative workers councils exist ¡n companies
with relatively higher innovation rates (Addison, J.T.;
Schnabel, C; Wagner, 1,1996; Dilger, A., 2002). This is not
too surprising. Only 36% of the responding firms have a
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cooperative workers council, the cooperation was identified
by self-selection on the scale, and the results do not include
process innovations that are more critical for workers
counáis as product innovations.
Summarizing, we find no indication for a supportive effect of
co-determinatton on innovation.
4.2.2. Owner-manager-structures
1. Technological change and innovation depend on the type of
corporate owners. This is supported in many ways, and it ¡s
certainly of interest to minority shareholders or other
stakeholders of a company.
Hoskissen et al. (2002) can show that pensión funds prefer a
strategy that relies heavily on internal research and
development and that prefers a high share of internally
developed new products, while investment funds prefer
acquiring new products or processes. The share of inside-
vs. outside directors can have a moderating effect.
Investments, including those in research and development,
are co-determined by the dividend policy of a Corporation.
This, ¡n turn, is determined by majority shareholders,
especially if one of these is a government. This observation
was established for Austrian corporations (Gugler, K., 2003).
A high concentration of owners who are not managers is
more strongly related with building high innovation
potentials ¡f these owners are institutions with long planning
horizons rather than individuáis with short planning horizons
(Zahra, PP.A., 1996).
Thus, owner preferences can have a strong influence on
technology and innovation when they can exert their power.
2. Corporations with a high free flow of shares can not be
influenced to follow the preferences of individual investors.
Thus, the preferences of managers can determine
technology and innovation strategies to a larger degree. It is
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a standard assumption of principal agent models that the
owners are rísk-neutral due to their ability to spread their
investment risks, while the managers are risk-averse
because of their reduced ability to spread their employment
risks. Following these assumptions it is no surprise to find a
few studies indicating less ¡nnovative activities in manager-
lead firms as compared with owner-lead firms (Fritz, W.,
1986; Kraft, K., 1989). However, more recent studies come
to contradictory results. Besides methodological aspects of
industry choice or sample size, these contradictory empirical
results might be explained by restrictions of owners
investments, as in family business, on the one hand and
particular management incentive structures on the other
hand. Management compensation might be tied to company
growth, which in turn can result from introducing more
innovations. Risk considerations and growth expectations
have to be balanced by such managers. Studies indícate that
the growth motive seems to be given a relatively higher
weight. In Germany and other European countries manager-
led firms have higher patent output and higher relative sales
from new products than owner-led firm (Czamitzki, D.; Kraft,
K, 2003; 2004a; 2004d).
3. The ability of highly concentrated owners to shape
technology and ¡nnovation strategy might be curbed by cióse
to perfect, and thus efficient financial markets. In fact it is
found: Owner-led firms in Germany seem to experience a
stronger constraint of capital, both internal and extemal
(Haid, A.; Weigand, I , 2001). Less perfect financial markets
allow concentrated owners to exert stronger influences on
innovation strategy than more perfect financial markets
(Lehmann, E.; Weigand, J., 2000).
4. Should highly concentrated ownership control management
by financial ratios one observes less innovation potentials as
compared with control by intensive exchange of other types
of communication (Munari, F.; Sobrero, M., 2003). And even
if owners are not concentrated but the share of equity ¡s
relatively low, creditors seem to use similar ¡nstruments to
discipline managers with respect to their innovation
strategies (Czamitzki, D.; Kraft, K., 20O4d).
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5. More differentiation can be achieved by considering variables
measuring technology on the one hand and innovation. In
this respect, a number of observations can be added. More
owner ¡nfluence, ¡nduding participation in management,
leads to smaller shares of new product sales, higher returns,
and lower research and development intensitles (Czarnitzki,
D.; Kraft, K., 2003; 2004 b; 2004 c). The authors admit that
one of these studies ¡s based on a rather unbalanced
sample, extending beyond corporations. Also, some of the
variables are relatively strongly correlated. It is not clear
whether the results could be upheld should financial market
influence be explicitly induded in the modeling. However, if
the dependent variable only measures whether innovations
occur or not (a zero-one-variable) no relationship to owner
influence vs. non-owner managers can be identified
(Czamitzki, D.; Kraft, K., 2004b).
Thus, owner-manager structures do have an influence on
technology and innovation. These influences seem to be
moderated by the influences exerted by the effidency of
financial markets, and the way that market stakeholders
communicate with management.
4.2.3 Characteristics of top management
Personal characteristics of top management may be a
moderating factor ¡n determining technology and innovation
strategies. Since owners or their representatives select top
managers this choice can have an effect that interrelates with
other variables.
1. Educational background of managers influences the
partition of investment budgets. Thus, CEO's with a
technical or science education spend relatively more on
research and development, those with a marketing
education spend more on advertising, and those with a
manufacturing education support investment in
production relatively more (Schrader, S t , 1995, p. 257).
Furthermore, past experiences or learning, the ability to
shape the corporate strategy (Schrader, St., 1995) and
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age (Baritel, K.A.; Jackson, PP.E., 1989) of managers
influence investment behavior and innovation behavior.
Risk perception ¡s shaped by the time spend ¡n a
Corporation and the level of hierarchy achieved, both
being indications for underlying variables such as
learning and problem oomprehension (March, J.G;
Shapira, Z., 1987). This, in turn, should influence
innovation strategy since this is a risky business.
2. All of this would not appear to be of relevance if
personal characteristics could be compensated or made
comparable by the proper choice of incentives. Planning,
supervisión and incentives are interacting variables in
the control of management (Gedenk, K.; Albers, S.,
1992). Still, supervisory board members are even more
convinced than management board members that
personality and professional experiences have much
higher importance in explaining managerial behavior
than incentive systems (Gedenk, K.; Albers, S., 1994;
Gedenk, K., 1998). This casts doubts on the application
of standard principal-agent-assumptions at the top
management level. However, the results by
Carnitzi/Kraft (2004) mentioned above let us believe that
managers are receptive to incentives, may be to strong
incentives only.
If personality and professional education of managers can
override the influences of incentive systems one should be
hesitant in defining corporate governance systems by structural
variables only. It should be added that while moderating effects
of the relationship of incentive systems on innovations are made
plausible with respect to national differences (Eisenberg, X,
1999), no empirical research into these effects is available.
4.2.4 Size of boards
It is suggested that the decisión quality of boards can be
depicted with respect to size by a curvilinear function that has a
máximum for medium-sized boards. If on top of this the quality
of member contributions to a decisión can be scaled it is possible
to construct optimum boards at least theoretically (Brockhoff, K.,
16
1970). Since empirical research cannot experimentally vary the
size of boards, one should either expect no relationship between
size and decisión quality if all boards are of equal size or a
function that is declining ¡f more boards are too large or
increasing if the majority of boards are too small. Since board
size is regulated by law in many countries depending on the size
of the company, such as Germany, the legal regulation might not
always indícate optimum choices.
For the US it is shown that Tobin's Q taken as a measure for
innovative potential decreases with increasing board size
(Yermack, D., 1996). The average board size in the sample is
12.25. Interestíngly, no such relation is found between board
size and research and development intensity. This could mean
that larger boards are more interested in planning inputs than
outputs or that larger boards are less concerned with improving
the interface situation that arises between research and
development and other downstream departments or that larger
boards decrease the quality of project selection, possibly by
more routine procedures.
A study of 5 European countries exhibits a similar, negative
relationship; it is significant only for the Netherlands and Great
Britain (Conyon, M.J.; Peck, S.I., 1998, p. 301). Interestingly,
average board size in these countries (8.7) is smaller than that
in the remaining three countries (10.9).
Earlier studies in Switzerland indicated a negative relationship as
well (Loderer, C; Peyer, U., 2002). Later studies, when the
average board (Verwaltungsrat) size had decreased did not
indícate any relationship (Beiner, St. et al., 2004). Also, no
¡ndication was found of a correlation of other control devises
with the size of the board. In view of the results of Conyon/Peck
(1998) it is hard to accept the explanation that corporations in
Switzerland had been successful in searching for the optimum
board síze and found ¡t at lower levéis.
Supervisory board size in Germany is heavily criticized. Very
large corporaf ons have 20 supervisory board members, ten each
representing shareholders and labor. To compare with one-tier
systems, such as in Switzerland, one would have to add the
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number of management board members to that of supen/isory
board members. If then, in fact, this constitutes a more than
optimum size one could think of tnstallíng technology or
innovation committees that report to the supervisory board to
compénsate ¡neffectiveness by specializatjon and división of
labor. It is interesting to note that Procter & Gamble and
Merlone Elettrodomestici seem to have such a committee
(Schmidt, R., 2004). However, we do not know whether the
committees were installed because of fear of moving beyond an
optimum board size.
5. Implications
5.1. Implications for regulatory institutions and
companies
1. We have collected a substantial number of indications for
the existence of both the technological ¡mperatve and the
strategic choice relations. However, knowledge is not deep
enough to construct optimum corporate governance systems
to meet specific corporate objectives. Also, corporations
rightfully seek to try out different sets of objectives to
support their competitive position. Therefore, regulators
should observe the conclusión from a US business
roundtable: "Good corporate governance is not a one size
fits all proposition, and a wide diversity of approaches to
corporate governance should be expected and ¡s entirely
appropriate" (Witt, P., 2004, p. 313).
2. In view of the implications of both, technological change and
corporate governance on competitiveness corporations
should look for the most appropriate governance structure.
" Harmonizaron" is not supportive in this situatíon. Rather, as
was argued for codes of good corporate governance
(Bernhardt, W., 2004), competition among governance
structures should be supported. Shareholders might be given
the right to choose. The models they choose from could be
those that are available in a designated set of countries,
such as the European countries within the EU. This approach
would avoid the high transactlon costs that arise both from
18
harmonization and from unlimited systems competition
(Demougin, D.; Witt, P., 2002).
3. Regulatory institutions should be aware of the fact that
setting governance rules has an influence on ¡nnovativeness.
While states might try to compénsate detrimental effects by
active "industrial policy" or other means (Casper, PP.; Lehrer
M.; Soskice, D., 1999; Casper, 2000; Casper, PP.; Kettler,
H.; 2001; Goyer, M.; 2001), the same cannot be expected
from institutions like stock exchanges defining listing rules.
4. While empirical research does not establish save grounds for
optimizing govemment structures in corporations, at least it
offers indications and guidelines. Further improvement is
necessary, and will be discussed in the next section.
5.2. Implications for research
1. As was said above, our knowledge is far from advising
optimum governance structures under a multitude of
environmental conditions. Substantial ¡mprovements in
research are necessary. At first, a standardization of
constructs would be helpful to provide safer ground for
comparison of study results. As in other fields, a catalogue
of tested constructs would be a first step in the right
direction. Singling out individual variables from complex
constructs and testing these in one of many national
environments falls short of identífying interdependences of
governance variables and other environmental subsystems.
2. Panel analysis appears to be an approach that could help to
test causality empirically, and including data from non-listed
companies could help to avoid biases both ¡n measurement
and in interpretation. These, together with the demand for
more specific error models in variables and for a more
encompassing endogenization of variables, is called for since
quite some time (Borsch-Supan, E.; Koke, J., 2002).
3. In view of the technological imperative an advancement in
measuring follow-on effects of new technologies would be
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helpful. Beneficial effects of new technologies are sometimes
cut away by short planning horizons ¡n companies, and
sometimes fall pray to risk-aversion of managers. This risk-
aversion is a personal characteristic, but at least to some
degree ¡t might be influenced by appropriate incentive
systems.
4. Some indications were found that one particular governance
structure can nave different effects on technology vis-á-vis
innovation. This can go even further by asking which type of
innovation is preferred, for instance characterized by degree
of novelty, visibility or appropriability of results. Even more
far-reaching is the idea that over time some periods prefer
particular types of innovations and other periods other
types, which would cali for different governance systems to
support these. It is argued that "increasing tensión between
radical technical change and the institutional restructuring
establish a new match between institutions and technologies
to support renewed growth (Edquist, Ch.; Johnson, B., 1997,
p. 55).
5. Many more dynamic effects can be imagined, going beyond
the few instants where dynamics in research and
development expenditures were considered in the empirical
work. A similar argument refers to non-linear relationships
which have mostly occurred only with respect to controiiing
company size. Other nonlinearities are plausible as well.
6. Some results shown varied with the type of method used. In
the longer run one can observe that improvements in
empirical methods discards earlier results. Multi-method
studies can shed light on the validity of outcomes.
7. A topic of specific interest is the demand for more research
into incentive systems at top management levéis under
different governance regimes. It is disturbing to observe that
empirical results are unstable or in conflict with standard
assumptions of principal-agent-theory. Since this is at the
heart of the problem, it is of special importance.
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